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Abstract
We survey literature comparing ination targeting (IT) and price-level
targeting (PT) as macroeconomic stabilisation policies. Our focus is on
New Keynesian models and areas that have seen signicant developments
since Amblers (2009) survey: optimal monetary policy; the zero lower
bound; nancial frictions; and transition costs of adopting a PT regime.
Amblers conclusion that PT improves social welfare in New Keynesian
models is fairly robust, but we note an interesting split in the literature:
PT consistently outperforms IT in models where policymakers commit
to simple Taylor-type rules, but results in favour of PT when policy-
makers minimise loss functions are overturned with small deviations from
the baseline model. Since the benecial e¤ects of PT appear to hang
on the joint assumption that agents are rational and the economy New
Keynesian, we discuss survey and experimental evidence on rational ex-
pectations and the applied macro literature on the empirical performance
of New Keynesian models. Overall, the evidence is not clear-cut, but we
note that New Keynesian models can pass formal statistical tests against
macro data and that models with rational expectations outperform those
with behavioural expectations (i.e. heuristics) in direct statistical tests.
We therefore argue that policymakers should continue to pay attention to
PT.
Keywords: ination targeting, price-level targeting, rational expec-
tations, stabilisation policy.
1 Introduction
The past two decades have seen a resurgence of interest in optimal monetary
policy, including research on potential alternatives to ination targeting (IT).
In this survey, we focus on an alternative policy that is considered a serious
contender to IT: price-level targeting (PT). The main di¤erence between IT
and PT is that, under a PT regime, the central bank aims to stabilise the
aggregate price level around a predetermined target price path. Hence, for
example, if there is an inationary shock that takes the price level above the
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target price path, below-average ination will be required in the future in order
to return the price level to target. This contrasts with an IT regime where
ination stabilisation is the goal of policy and above average ination today
would be followed by average (i.e. on-target) ination tomorrow. In other
words, bygones are bygonesunder IT, whereas past deviations from target are
corrected under a PT regime. We focus on PT because it has been the subject of
considerable debate in recent years both in academia and central banks. Most
notably, the Bank of Canada recently published a detailed review of the costs
and benets of PT which argues that the potential benets do not justify the
costs and risks associated with a change in regime (see Bank of Canada, 2011).
The Bank of Canada expressed concerns, in particular, about whether agents
would understand the workings of a PT regime and take it into account in their
future expectations in accordance with the standard modelling assumption of
rational expectations.
In this survey, we shed more light on the likely costs and benets of PT by
reviewing recent theoretical and empirical evidence, and we also engage with
the Bank of Canadas conclusions. Our survey begins by discussing recent
developments in the monetary policy literature before turning to the macro sta-
bilisation literature on IT versus PT. We focus on New Keynesian models and
important developments since Amblers (2009) survey: optimal monetary pol-
icy under commitment and discretion; the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates; nancial frictions; and the costs of transition to a PT regime. Some of
these recent developments are initial attempts to address issues raised by the
nancial crisis. The main theoretical nding of the survey is that Amblers
original conclusion that PT can improve social welfare in New Keynesian mod-
els remains intact, but the list of caveats is somewhat longer. In particular,
we note an interesting split in the literature: PT consistently outperforms IT in
New Keynesian models where policymakers commit to simple Taylor-type rules,
but results in favour of PT which are derived from models where central banks
minimise loss functions can be overturned with small deviations from the base-
line model. In addition, the rational expectations assumption is crucial when
considering the costs of transition to a PT regime. These ndings encouraged
us to focus on the assumptions on which the benecial e¤ects of PT hang: are
economic agents rational and the economy New Keynesian?1
With this question in mind, the second half of the survey reviews recent ex-
perimental and survey literature on rational expectations, and the applied macro
literature on New Keynesian models. Both of these areas have seen important
developments in recent years and they o¤er di¤erent insights. Both experiments
and surveys tend to reject the strict rational expectations hypothesis, but the
experimental literature provides some support for rational expectations as an
approximation, while survey evidence should not be interpreted as conclusive
statistical evidence against rational expectations (for reasons that we discuss).
On the other hand, the applied macro literature initiated by Christiano et al.
1Other useful surveys of price-level targeting include Cournède and Moccero (2009) and
Kahn (2009). Neither Ambler (2009) or these papers survey empirical evidence on rational
expectations and New Keynesian models.
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(2005) is broadly supportive of New Keynesian models with rational expec-
tations but should be treated with caution because it does not amount to a
formal statistical test that accepts or rejects the model. There is, however, a
more recent strand of literature that has formally tested New Keynesian models
using indirect inference. We explain this approach before discussing some of the
main results from this literature. Overall, the evidence on rational expectations
and New Keynesian models is not clear-cut, but we note that New Keynesian
models can pass formal statistical tests against macro data and that models
with rational expectations outperform those with behavioural expectations (i.e.
heuristics) in direct statistical tests.2 These ndings suggest that the benets
of PT might be higher than envisaged by many policymakers, including the
Bank of Canada. We therefore argue that policymakers should continue to pay
attention to PT in the future.
2 Background: New Keynesian models and the
Bank of Canada Review
In this section we rst set out the baseline New Keynesian model which provides
the foundation for the macro stabilisation literature on IT versus PT. We then
briey discuss the literature on sticky prices in relation to the Calvo (1983) price-
setting mechanism that is central in New Keynesian models. Finally, we provide
an overview of the main conclusions of the Bank of Canadas 2011 Review of
PT to provide context for our detailed survey of the literature that follows.
2.1 The baseline New Keynesian model
The distinguishing feature of New Keynesian models is that monopolistically-
competitive rms set prices optimally to maximise prots, subject to constraints
on how frequently they can re-set prices or how costly it is to do so. In the
baseline specication due to Calvo (1983), each rm can change its price with a
constant probability, so the interval between price changes is a random variable.
Prot maximisation by the rms that are able to re-optimise leads to a rst-
order condition that relates current price to a mark-up on marginal cost and
expected future price. Log-linearising this rst-order condition around a zero-
ination steady-state and aggregating across rms leads to the baseline New
Keynesian Phillips curve in which economy-wide ination t depends on the
output gap xt and expected future ination:
t= Ett+1+xt+ut (1)
where  is the discount factor of the representative household (the sole owner
of rms), Et is the conditional expectations operator,  > 0 is the slope of the
2We provide a formal denition of behavioural expectations in Section 2.3. We discuss in
Sections 2.3 and 5.1 how these expectations relate to alternative approaches in the literature.
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Phillips curve, and ut is a cost-push shock that follows an AR(1) process.3
Equation (1) states that ination depends positively on the output gap and
(rationally) expected future ination. The main way in which the New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve di¤ers from a more traditional neoclassical Phillips curve is
that ination depends on expected future ination (Ett+1), and not expected
current ination (Et 1t). This feature of the model is plausible because there
is substantial empirical evidence that anticipated changes in monetary policy
have real e¤ects. It also implies that ination depends on the expected dis-
counted stream of future output gaps and cost-push shocks, so that managing
expectations about the future is crucial for current ination control.
The demand side of the model is standard: consumers maximise utility by
choosing bond holdings optimally, giving an Euler equation for each household.
If we aggregate across households we get a single consumption Euler equation in
which aggregate consumption is a function of the real interest rate and expected
future consumption. Log-linearising this equation and imposing the market-
clearing condition that consumption equals output minus government spending,
we get the IS curve in the baseline New Keynesian model:
xt = Etxt+1   (Rt   Ett+1) + gt (2)
where  > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, xt is the output
gap, Rt is the nominal interest rate, and gt is a government spending shock
that follows an AR(1) process.
Like the New Keynesian Phillips curve, the IS curve is forward-looking: it
emphasises the importance of expectations about the future in the determina-
tion of current outcomes. In particular, the current output gap rises with the
expected future output gap (due to consumersdesire to smooth consumption)
and falls when the short-term real interest rate, Rt   Ett+1, is increased.
In addition to the optimising microfoundations of the New Keynesian model,
an important feature is that a social loss function in ination and output gap
variations can be derived as an approximation to the utility function of the
representative household; see e.g. Walsh (2010, Ch. 8.6). As a result, reseach-
ers can conduct social welfare analyses which are internally consistent with the
model itself and broadly consistent with the stated objectives of real-world cen-
tral banks. The approximate social loss function in the baseline New Keynesian
model can be represented as follows:
Lt = Et
1X
j=0
j(2t+j + x
2
t+j) (3)
3The cost-push shock is appended to this equation because it introduces a meaningful
trade-o¤ between ination and output gap volatility. Alternatively, a Phillips curve that
includes a cost-push shock can be derived directly by allowing for exogenous uctuations in
rmsdemand elasticities or exogenous uctuations in taxes (see Steinsson, 2003).
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where  > 0 is the relative weight on output gap variations, which depends
upon the parameters of the model.
This social loss function has two important roles. First, Equation (3) can be
used as a basis for comparing social welfare across alternative monetary policy
regimes like IT and PT; see Vestin (2006). Second, by minimising Equation (3)
subject to (1) by choosing ination and the output gap directly, we can derive
rst-order condition that implements the optimal monetary policy. This condi-
tion provides insight into the principles of e¤ective policymaking and allows us
to analyse the optimal response of interest rates to shocks that hit the economy;
this can be done by substituting the rst-order condition into Equation (2). The
optimal responses of ination and the output gap can also be backed outin a
similar manner (see e.g. Clarida et al., 1999).
The approach of deriving optimal policies has been popular in the theo-
retical literature. This requires the researcher to make an assumption about
whether the central bank re-optimises on a period-by-period basis (discretion)
or can make binding promises about the entire future path of monetary pol-
icy (commitment). For instance, with the baseline New Keynesian model and
the assumption of commitment, Evans and Honkapohja (2006) show that the
optimal commitment policy and the implied interest rate rule are as follows:
t =  

(xt xt 1) (4)
Rt = c1xt 1 + c2gt + c3ut (5)
where c1; c2 and c3 are complicated functions of the model parameters.
An alternative to the optimal policy approach is to closethe model with an
instrument rule for the nominal interest rate. The most commonly used interest
rate rule is a log-linear Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993):
Rt = ct + cxxt (6)
where c; cx > 0 are the reaction coe¢ cients on ination and the output gap,
respectively; we treat the ination target and steady state interest rate as zero
here and in what follows.
As we can see by comparing Equations (5) and (6), Taylor rules are generally
suboptimal policies  i.e. they will not minimise Equation (3). Nevertheless,
Taylor rules have become a popular way of modelling monetary policy because
they are easy to communicate; more robust across alternative models of the
economy than optimal policies (see Taylor, 1999); and a useful way of describing
the behaviour of central banks in estimated general equilibrium models.
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2.2 Calvo contracts and micro evidence on sticky prices
There is considerable empirical evidence suggesting that prices are sticky in
nominal terms as assumed by Calvo (1983) price-setting. In a seminal paper,
Bils and Klenow (2004) conclude that average price spells in the US last between
3 and 4 months, though subsequent results in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008)
that exclude sales point to longer price spells of 7 to 11 months a result which
is more consistent with early empirical work on price stickiness in the US. Dhyne
et al. (2006) nd similar results for the Euro Area as part of research conducted
by the Ination Persistence Network at the European Central Bank (ECB):
the average duration of price spells is 10 to 13 months. Consistent with these
ndings, the Calvo reset probability is typically calibrated to imply average
price spells of between 2 and 4 quarters in New Keynesian models.
The factors responsible for nominal price rigidities remain somewhat of a
mystery, however. Under Calvo price-setting these factors are not modelled:
rms are literally unable to change their prices in some periods, and the prob-
ability of being able to change price in any given period is independent of the
date at which prices were last re-set. These are clearly not realistic assump-
tions, but they make the model highly tractable. And because the group of
rms that is able to change price is selected randomly in each period, the Calvo
specication implies that, over a given period of time, some rms will be able
to change their prices more frequently than others, as we see in the data (e.g.
Bils and Klenow, 2004). Therefore, the Calvo model captures some important
features of real-world price-setting within a highly tractable framework.4
Calvo price-setting has, however, been criticised along several lines. It is
well known, for example, that the assumption of a constant reset probability
means that the Calvo model cannot explain why rms reset their prices more
frequently when ination is high. In addition, some authors have noted that the
standard New Keynesian model with Calvo price-setting implies that moderate
to high levels of trend ination have implausibly large e¤ects on the deterministic
steady-state and stochastic mean levels of output (Ascari, 2004; Amano et al.,
2007). Several alternative models of nominal rigidity have been proposed in the
literature, including state-dependent pricing models where rms change prices
more frequently when it is more protable to do so (e.g. Golosov and Lucas,
2007) and generalised Taylor models where there are several sectors with Taylor
(1980) contracts of di¤erent durations (e.g. Dixon and Le Bihan, 2012).5
Most notably, the recent papers by Midrigan (2011) and Karadi and Rei¤
(2012) consider state-dependent pricing models in which heterogenous rms face
menu costsof price adjustment. Midrigan (2011) shows that a menu-cost model
that can match a wide array of micro price-setting facts implies aggregate real
e¤ects of monetary policy shocks which are quantitatively similar to those in
4An alternative to Calvo price-setting is the Taylor model (Taylor, 1980) of overlapping
xed-duration price contracts, but this specication is less convenient because it requires as
many groups of price-setters as price-spell durations.
5For a useful discussion of state-dependent pricing models, see Walsh (2010, Ch. 6.2).
Both Taylor models and Calvo models are examples of time-dependent pricing models.
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the Calvo model. However, Karadi and Rei¤ (2012) point out that this result is
overturned for relatively large business cycle shocks because, in state-dependent
models, the fraction of rms changing price rises sharply as the magnitude of
shocks is increased, making the aggregate price level somewhat more exible.
By contrast, the fraction of rms changing price remains constant in the Calvo
model. Using data on value-added tax changes in Hungary, Karadi and Rei¤
show that the price level reacted exibly and asymmetrically to large positive
and negative shocks. They note that a menu-cost model similar to Midrigan
(2011) can replicate both of these facts, whereas the Calvo model cannot, though
it does remain a reasonable approximation of the menu-cost model for standard
business cycle shocks in an economy with low ination.
In summary, state-dependent models of price-setting can match the micro
data somewhat better than the standard Calvo model, but the aggregate im-
plications of the two models appear to be similar in normal economic circum-
stances. Here we limit our attention to the New Keynesian model with Calvo
price-setting because this enables us to concentrate (i) on what the literature
has to say about whether central banks should drop an ination target where
bygones are bygonesin favour of a price-level target,6 and (ii) on models that
have been subjected to formal statistical tests and not rejected by them; see Sec-
tions 5.2 to 5.4. However, since we cannot be sure that our conclusions about
PT would carry over to alternative models of price-setting, the reader should
bear in mind the caveats of the Calvo model mentioned in this section. We save
a fuller discussion of the aggregate implications of New Keynesian models until
Section 5, where we survey several papers from the applied macro literature.7
2.3 Bank of Canada Review of Price-Level Targeting
In 2006 the Bank of Canada announced its intention to study the costs and
benets of PT, with a view to potentially changing its monetary policy mandate
at the next renewal date in 2011 (see Bank of Canada, 2006). This made it the
rst central bank in recent history to seriously entertain the possibility of PT
regime. The Bank of Canada subsequently published a Review of the costs
and benets of PT that included several policy recommendations, including the
reasons behind its decision to stick with an IT mandate until at least 2016 (see
Bank of Canada, 2011). In this section, we discuss these conclusions in order to
provide context for our survey of the recent literature that follows.
Since the only episode of PT in history was in Sweden during the Great De-
pression (see Berg and Jonung, 1999), the Bank of Canada Review focused on
6 It should be noted that results regarding the relative merits of PT have not yet been
established in state-dependent pricing models due to the additional complexities involved in
working with these models. We are aware of only a small number of studies that assess the
merits of PT in alternative time-dependent pricing models (e.g. Wolman, 2005).
7We note in Section 5.1 that price indexation which helps New Keynesian models to match
macro data  is at odds with the micro evidence on price-setting cited above. Importantly,
however, the test of rational versus behavioural expectations that we consider in Section
5.4 takes place in a New Keynesian model where price indexation is absent. The rational
expectations version of the model is not rejected by this formal statistical test.
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model simulations and laboratory experiments, rather than empirical evidence.
It argues that although there are modest, but economically signicant, poten-
tial gains from PT,realising these gains would be di¢ cult in practice because
the models assume that agents are forward-looking, fully conversant with the
implications of PT and trust policy-makers to live up to their commitments
(Bank of Canada 2011, p. 14).8 In other words, the Bank expressed doubts
about the ability of households and rms to understand the workings of PT and
argues that the regime might lack credibility in the short-term. The Bank of
Canada summarised its overall conclusion on PT as follows:
Given the current state of knowledge, the potential benets of PT
in.increasing long-term certainty about the price level and.providing
greater short-term macroeconomic stability, relative to the current
IT framework, do not clearly outweigh the costs and risks associ-
ated with real-world expectations and credibility falling short of the
model ideal. (Bank of Canada 2011, p. 20)
The costs and risksof real-world expectations falling short of the model
ideal have been highlighted in the early literature on PT. For example, Lebow
et al. (1992) and Haldane and Salmon (1995) nd that PT raises both output
and ination volatility under adaptive expectations, which are purely backward-
looking.9 Thus, the rational expectations assumption is central to the costs and
benets of PT relative to IT. For this reason, we review empirical evidence on ra-
tional expectations and New Keynesian models in the second half of this survey.
We also consider in some detail a macro test of rational expectations against be-
havioural expectations, an alternative type of expectation formation that di¤ers
non-trivially from rational expectations. In particular, agents with behavioural
expectations choose relative weights on extrapolative (i.e. backward-looking)
forecasts and steady-state forecasts based on their past success.10 The test of
expectations we consider is relevant to the IT versus PT debate because, as
emphasised by the Bank of Canada quote above, there is a widespread view
among policymakers that private agents have expectations which are (at least
partly) backward-looking, which would imply poor performance of PT.
On the theoretical side, we review recent research that sheds more light
on the transition costs associated with PT and the extent to which important
results in the PT literature are robust to deviations from the baseline New
Keynesian model. We turn rst to the theoretical literature and then to the
empirical evidence on rational expectations and New Keynesian models.
8To ensure consistency with the abbreviations used in this survey, price-level targeting was
abbreviated PT and not as PLT as in Bank of Canada (2011).
9For a more detailed discussion of this early literature, see Section 2 of Ambler (2009).
10The seminal paper in this literature is Brock and Hommes (1997). In Section 5.1 we
discuss the relationship between these expectations and alternatives in the macro literature.
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3 Macro stabilisation literature
As Ambler (2009) makes clear, PT was initially motivated as a way of providing
the economy with long-term price stability. Nevertheless, most of the recent
interest in PT comes from its implications for short run macro stabilisation, that
is, economic stability at business cycle frequencies. In fact, the recent resurgence
of interest in PT has gone hand-in-hand with the rise in popularity of New
Keynesian models, since there are welfare gains from history dependencein a
forward-looking, rational expectations environment (Woodford, 2003). History
dependence means that monetary policy should respond systematically to past
economic conditions, as well current and expected future economic outcomes.
PT is history dependent because the central bank promises to o¤set deviations
from the target price path in the future. As a result, PT will tend to produce
superior stabilisation outcomes to policies that lack history dependence.
In this section we rst discuss the main ndings from the macro stabilisation
literature on IT versus PT, as surveyed by Ambler (2009). We then turn to
more recent contributions that shed light on robustness to extensions of the
baseline New Keynesian model. For ease of reference, we split the discussion
that follows into four subsections: discretion versus commitment; the zero lower
bound; nancial frictions; and the costs of transition from IT to PT.
3.1 Discretion versus commitment
In a seminal paper, Kydland and Prescott (1977) showed that the distinction
between discretion and commitment is crucial in rational expectations models.
Under discretion, the policymaker optimises on a period-by-period basis. As a
result, it cannot make binding promises about the future and must take future
expectations as given. This inability to commit implies suboptimal outcomes
because policy cannot inuence future expectations and so e¤ectively has fewer
instruments available to achieve its objectives. A classic example of a suboptimal
outcome under discretion is the ination biasproblem highlighted by Barro
and Gordon (1983), whereby an equilibrium with steady-state ination above
the socially-optimal level results from a desire to push output above the natural
rate. An e¢ cient equilibrium outcome can be restored in various ways which
involve delegating the central bank a loss function that di¤ers from the true
social loss function (Rogo¤, 1985; Walsh, 1995; Svensson, 1999).
It is important to note that discretion leads to suboptimal outcomes in dy-
namic models with rational expectations, even if the central banks output target
is not over-ambitious (the assumption made in almost all of the recent litera-
ture, and in all the papers we review here). Svensson (1997) and Clarida et
al. (1999) dub this phenomenon stabilisation biasbecause it implies that the
central banks response to shocks that hit the economy is suboptimal, so that
ination and output gaps deviate from their rst-best outcomes. As with the
ination bias, stabilisation bias implies that delegating monetary policy to a
central bank without IT preferences could improve social outcomes.
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3.1.1 Discretion
Svensson (1999) was the rst to formally investigate whether delegating mone-
tary policy to a central bank with a PT loss function could improve stabilisa-
tion outcomes under rational expectations. Using a model with a Lucas-type
(or Neoclassical) Phillips curve, he showed that delegating PT preferences to
the central bank delivers a free lunchresult: ination variability is lower for
any given level of output gap variability if output is su¢ ciently persistent. In
e¤ect, PT eliminates some of the useless discretion present under IT because
the central bank is required to undo current deviations from its target price
path in the future, so that discretionary behaviour becomes more costly. The
crucial distinction is that bygones are bygonesunder IT, whereas PT makes
the objective function of a discretionary policymaker depend in part upon past
outcomes, so that discretion carries a penalty which is absent under IT.
Although Svenssons model features rational expectations, it is subject to
two important limitations. First, the economy is described by a Phillips curve
which performs poorly empirically because it implies that only unanticipated
changes in policy have real e¤ects. Second, the social loss function Svensson
uses cannot be derived from the utility function of a representative agent. As
noted in Section 2.1, the New Keynesian model can address both these criticisms.
Vestin (2006) assesses the performance of PT in the baseline New Keynesian
model. He shows that the free lunch result remains intact. Intuitively, since
rms in New Keynesian models set current prices as a function of expected fu-
ture prices, the extent to which the aggregate price level rises in response to
an inationary shock depends on the impact of policy upon price-setters expec-
tations about future ination. Under IT, ination expectations are e¤ectively
xed on the ination target because bygones are bygones. Under PT, by con-
trast, rms expect a rise in current prices to be followed by a contraction in
demand and lower future prices, in order to return the price level to its target
path. As a result, rms raise their prices less in response to inationary (i.e.
cost-push) shocks under a PT regime, implying lower ination variability for
any given level of output gap variability.
The free lunch result also remains intact when the rms who are unable to
re-optimise choose to index their prices to past ination, except in the special
case of full indexation (Røisland, 2006; Gaspar et al. 2007).11 Indexing prices to
past ination leads to the hybrid New Keynesian Phillips curvewhere ination
is also related to lagged ination:
t   t 1 = Et(t+1   t) + xt + ut (7)
11Røisland (2006) shows that discretion will replicate the optimal commitment policy when
the central bank is delegated a period loss function (pt  pt 1)2+ ex2t , where pt is the price
level (in logs) and e is the modied weight on output gap variations. Vestins (2006) result
that PT is optimal arises as a special case when there is zero indexation (i.e.  = 0), while
IT is optimal under full indexation (i.e.  = 1). When 0 <  < 1, the optimal loss function
under discretion is usually interpreted as a hybrid ination/price-level target, but Gaspar et
al. (2007, pp. 19-20) argue that this is e¤ectively PT with a longer target horizon.
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where 0    1 represents the degree of indexation to past ination, and
t   t 1 is the quasi-di¤erencein ination.
Although this hybrid Phillips curve performs better against macro data than
the standard New Keynesian Phillips curve, it is di¢ cult to justify because
price-setters are assumed to index their prices in a purely backward-looking (and
hence non-rational) manner. The assumption of price indexation is also strongly
at odds with the empirical evidence on price-setting cited in Section 2.2. Galí
and Gertler (1999) have shown that one can also justify a partially backward-
looking New Keynesian Phillips curve by having some fraction of price-setters
follow a simple rule-of-thumb when setting prices, but this assumption can be
criticised on similar grounds. In this case, the results in Nessén and Vestin
(2005) show that PT will dominate IT only if the fraction of rule-of-thumb
price-setters remains su¢ ciently small.12
Blake et al. (2011) tackle a somewhat di¤erent issue. In particular, since
there are multiple rational expectations equilibria under discretion when the
baseline New Keynesian model is augmented with capital accumulation (see
Blake and Kirsanova, 2012), the lowest welfare equilibrium under delegation to
a PT central bank may be inferior to the highest welfare equilibrium attain-
able under IT. Consequently, in the absence of a mechanism for selecting one
equilibrium over another, it is generally not possible to predict whether PT will
dominate IT. Finally, Masson and Shukayev (2012) show that if the central bank
operates under discretion and the public believes that there is the possibility
it will rebase the price-level target in response to large shocks, there can be
multiple equilibria even in the absence of capital accumulation. As a result, the
economy could end up in a low credibility equilibrium where output volatility
is increased and the benecial e¤ects of PT are reduced or even reversed.
3.1.2 Commitment
The standard argument made in favour of discretion is that, in practice, no
major central bank makes any kind of binding commitment over the course of
its future monetary policy (Clarida et al. 1999, p. 1671). It is not obvious,
however, that discretion provides a better description of the real-world behav-
ior of central banks than commitment, because it implies that avoidable policy
mistakes are repeated ad innitum. Moreover, as is now familiar in the con-
text of formal forward guidance, central banks do adopt contingent rules in
which there are binding forward targets for ination and output that commit
the central bank except in respect of its contemporary response to shocks.13
12Under the baseline calibration of Nessén and Vestin (2005), PT outperforms IT under
discretion if the fraction of rule-of-thumb price-setters is less than 0.68 (see Figure 6 of their
paper and the surrouding discussion, pp. 85355).
13Since 2008, explicit forward guidance has also been used by several central banks, including
the Bank of Canada, the ECB, the Bank of England, the Federal Reserve, and the Bank of
Japan. For example, the Federal Reserve announced in August 2011 that economic conditions
are likely to warrant exceptionally low levels for the federal funds rate at least through
mid-2013; see the Press Releases section of the Federal Reserves website.
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Commitment solutions are also of interest because they provide guidance on
optimal monetary policy. The commitment-based literature on PT has two dif-
ferent strands: the rst focuses on optimal monetary policy under commitment,
and the second on commitments to simple Taylor-type interest rate rules.
Optimal commitment policies. If commitment is possible, then the social
loss function, Equation (3), will be minimised by giving the central bank an
IT loss function. Few economists believe that central banks can implement
fully optimal commitment policies in practice, but it is nevertheless useful to
study these policies to identify circumstances where delegating an alternative
loss function such as PT may, or may not, improve social outcomes. This section
dicusses recent literature in this regard.
One well-known result in relation to the baseline New Keynesian model is
that optimal commitment implies price stationarityand history dependence
(Clarida et al., 1999; Woodford, 2003). As noted by Vestin (2006), PT out-
performs IT under discretion precisely because delegating a PT loss function
to the central bank makes the price level stationary and policy history depen-
dent, hence moving the discretionary solution closer to the optimal commitment
policy.14 By contrast, a discretionary IT regime implies base-level drift in the
price level and lacks history dependence because bygones are bygones. History
dependence is a general feature of optimal policy in forward-looking models; it
is therefore robust across alternative New Keynesian models.
The price stationarity result is not similarly robust, however: minor modi-
cations of the baseline New Keynesian model can overturn the result that a
stationary price level is optimal. For instance, in the case of the hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve, Røisland (2006) and Gaspar et al. (2007) have shown
that if all rms index their prices to past ination (i.e.  = 1), then the optimal
commitment policy implies base-level drift in the price level. Steinsson (2003)
showed that the same conclusion holds when some fraction of price-setters are
backward-looking and follow a simple rule-of-thumb when setting prices, as in
Galí and Gertler (1999). In addition, Levin et al. (2010) show that optimal pol-
icy involves considerable base-level drift in response to contractionary demand
shocks when the zero lower bound on interest rates is a binding constraint.
More recently, Amano et al. (2012) showed that base-level drift is optimal
in the baseline New Keynesian model if the central bank and agents must make
decisions before current shocks to the economy are observed. Intuitively, the
benets of price stationarity in the baseline case come from the expectation that
policy will o¤set inationary shocks, which in turn dampens the impact of shocks
on current ination. But if the central bank cannot observe current shocks to
ination, it cannot react directly to these shocks and so cannot inuence price-
settersexpectations in a favourable way. The benets of price stationarity are
therefore lost and it becomes optimal to treat inationary shocks as bygones.
Lastly, Gerberding et al. (2012) consider a New Keynesian model with
14Vestin (2006) shows that PT can exactly replicate the optimal commitment policy in the
baseline New Keynesian model if there is no persistence in the cost-push shock.
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nominal rigidity in both the intermediate goods sector and the nal goods sector
and show that PT performs poorly. The reasoning is that PT makes the price
level in the nal goods sector stationary, whereas under the optimal policy
there is considerable base-level drift in the price level after a sector-specic
negative productivity shock. Moreover, PT permits somewhat more drift in
the intermediate goods price level than is optimal, so it has additional welfare
costs which would not arise if one of the sectors had exible prices that could
adjust freely with relative productivity without creating welfare losses (see Aoki,
2001). This trade-o¤ between targeting one nominal rigidity at the expense of
exacerbating the welfare costs of another was rst highlighted by Erceg et al.
(2000) in a model with sticky wages and prices.15 While increasing the target
horizon of policy lowers the welfare costs of PT by making this trade-o¤ less
severe, PT is clearly outperformed by IT for policy-relevant target horizons.
In short, history dependence is a robust feature of the optimal commitment
policy in New Keynesian models, but price stationarity is not. This nding
has implications for the design of the optimal central bank loss function under
discretion since it narrows down the set of models in which PT is likely to
outperform IT.
Commitment to Taylor rules. The second strand of commitment literature
has assessed the performance of IT and PT Taylor rules in New Keynesian
models. Simple interest rate rules are motivated by the argument that they
may provide a better representation of the behaviour of central banks than
fully optimal policies since they are easy to communicate, more robust across
alternative models of the economy (see Taylor, 1999), and easier to implement as
they do not imply a direct policy response to economic shocks which are di¢ cult
to observe in practice.16 Whereas IT Taylor rules relate the nominal interest
rate to a measure of the output gap and an ination gap (like the original Taylor
rule), PT Taylor rules instead respond to a price-level gap:17
Rt = cp(pt   pt ) + cxxt (8)
where cp; cx > 0 are reaction coe¢ cients, pt is the log of the aggregate price
level and pt is the target price level (expressed in logs).
15Erceg et al. (2000) note that if there is more than one source of nominal rigidity in the
economy, then it is optimal to target most forcefully the wage or price that is most rigid.
In the baseline calibration of the Gerberding et al. (2012) model, consumer prices are only
slightly more rigid than intermediate goods prices, so it is highly suboptimal to focus solely
on stabilisation of consumer prices as under PT.
16For example, Equation (6) does not imply a direct response to economic shocks but
Equation (5) does, and so does the implied optimal interest rate rule under discretion (see
Clarida et al. 1999, p. 1672).
17When comparing regimes using Taylor rules, the reaction coe¢ cients are typically chosen
to minimise the social loss function obtainable under that rule. In addition, some papers in
the literature allow for interest rate smoothingthrough dependence of the nominal interest
rate on its lagged value.
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The Taylor rule literature includes several analyses of PT in open economies.
An early contribution to this literature was Batini and Yates (2003). They show
that the degree of openness of an economy is important for comparisons of IT
and PT. In their model the real exchange rate enters the Phillips curve, so
that the variability of ination depends on uctuations in the real exchange
rate, with this channel becoming more important as the degree of openness of
the economy is increased. On the one hand, PT can have a positive impact
on ination stabilisation because the uncovered interest parity (UIP) condition
introduces an additional channel through which managing expectations matters
for economic outcomes. On the other hand, PT could lead to a deterioration
in economic stability relative to IT, because it makes interest rates somewhat
more volatile, and this feeds back to greater real exchange rate volatility by the
UIP condition. In ranking IT and PT regimes in welfare terms, it is the relative
size of these two e¤ects that matters.
Much of the subsequent research in this literature has been carried out by
or in conjunction with the Bank of Canada. For instance, Coletti et al. (2008)
compared IT and PT in the two-country IMF Global Economy Model (GEM), a
medium-scale model designed to enable open-economy issues to be investigated
within a microfounded framework that is suitable for policy analysis (see Laxton,
2008). This model contains several sources of nominal rigidity and is forward-
looking; it can therefore be viewed as an extension of the New Keynesian model.
Coletti et al. (2008) calibrated the model for Canada (with the US as the second
country) and included tradables and non-tradables sectors which are subject
to sector-specic shocks, giving the BoC-GEM model. They found that a PT
Taylor rule outperforms an IT one in terms of ination and output gap stability,
primarily because shocks to the terms of trade strengthen the case for PT due
to its role as a nominal anchor that stabilises the domestic price level.
PT also tends to outperform IT in other similar open economy models of
Canada because the gains from PT due to extra stabilisation through the expec-
tations channel outweigh the losses involved in responding to additional shocks
in order to stabilise the aggregate price level; see Murchison (2010). It is worth
noting, however, that dominance of PT over IT is not guaranteed when poli-
cymakers commit to Taylor rules: Coletti et al. (2012) consider an extended
version of the BoC-GEM model with separate energy and non-energy sectors
and nd that PT improves stabilisation relative to IT in the case of non-energy
commodity supply shocks, but not in response to energy commodity supply
shocks and commodity demand shocks.
3.1.3 Summary
To summarise, PT tends to dominate IT in several di¤erent variants of open
economy New Keynesian models when policymakers commit to simple Taylor-
type rules. Hence, the main results highlighted by Giannoni (2010) in the con-
text of the baseline New Keynesian model appear to carry over to open economy
models. By contrast, the result that the optimal policy implies a stationary
price level is sensitive to minor modications of the New Keynesian model, as
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is the performance of PT under discretion. These ndings have relevance for
the choice between IT and PT regimes because the real-world policies of central
banks are probably best characterised either by discretion or commitment to
simple instrument rules. We return to the argument that committing to PT
Taylor rules is benecial after discussing whether this result also holds in the
presence of the zero lower bound and nancial frictions.
3.2 The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
In simple terms, the zero lower bound (ZLB) states that nominal interest rates
cannot fall below zero in an economy where money is untaxed and can be stored
without cost. Aided by advances in computing power, the macro stabilisation
literature has recently incorporated the ZLB into New Keynesian models as an
occasionally-binding constraint.18
Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) was the seminal contribution in this litera-
ture. They introduce the ZLB into the baseline New Keynesian model and show
that the optimal commitment policy implies a state-contingent target price level
at times when the ZLB is binding. Intuitively, by promising additional future
ination in response to deationary pressure at the ZLB, policymakers can drive
down (ex ante) real interest rates and provide extra stimulus to the output gap.
Since this policy implies base-level drift in response to shocks that drive the
economy to the ZLB, price level stationarity is no longer optimal, unlike in the
baseline New Keynesian model. However, Eggertsson and Woodford show that
the optimal commitment policy which would be di¢ cult to implement in prac-
tice can be approximated by a simple rule that aims at a xed target price
level, whereas a standard IT rule performs poorly by comparison. The key to
this result is that the real interest rate does not respond to the severity of a
ZLB episode under the IT rule, because ination expectations are xed on the
ination target. By contrast, under the PT rule, the real interest rate falls as
ZLB episodes worsen because agents rationally expect enough future ination
to return the price level to its xed target. The stimulus to the output gap from
lower real interest rates aids the economys recovery from the ZLB.
Formal welfare analyses of optimal policy with an ocassionally-binding ZLB
can be found in Adam and Billi (2006, 2007). The model in Adam and Billi
(2006) follows Eggertsson and Woodford (2003), but they calibrate the model to
US data using shocks from the Great Moderation period. In order to evaluate
social welfare, these shocks are used to simulate the model. They nd that zero
nominal interest rates occur rather infrequently under the optimal commitment
policy only about one quarter in every 17 years, or an unconditional probability
of 1.5 per cent. As a result, the additional welfare loss due to the ZLB is
quite small at approximately 1 per cent of the welfare loss generated by sticky
prices. Adam and Billi (2007) extend the analysis of optimal policy to the
case of discretion. They nd that the welfare losses imposed by discretion
relative to optimal commitment increase by around two-thirds when the ZLB is
18For a detailed review of the early literature on the zero lower bound, see Yates (2004).
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an occassionally-binding constraint, suggesting that the potential welfare gains
from well-designed alternatives to IT are much larger when one accounts for
the lower bound. Nakov (2008) takes up this theme. His contribution is to
assess social welfare for a variety of zero-truncated Taylor rules, which he argues
provide a more plausible representation of real-world policymaking than optimal
policies. All the rules perform poorly compared to optimal commitment, with
relative losses for PT and IT Taylor rules of 800 per cent and 1400 per cent
respectively.19 Crucially, however, constraining the IT-PT comparison to simple
Taylor rules leaves intact the conclusion that PT is a signicant improvement
on IT in the presence of an ocassionally-binding ZLB.
Finally, an important recent contribution to the ZLB literature is Coibion
et al. (2012). They also focus on a New Keynesian model with an occasionally-
binding ZLB and Taylor rules, but their model is log-linearised around a non-
zero trend ination rate, so that the optimal rate of ination can be studied.
Under IT, moderate trend ination is optimal in order to raise average nominal
interest rates and hence reduce the probability of hitting the ZLB (and its
associated welfare losses) Under PT, the likelihood of the ZLB being reached
for any given trend ination rate is much lower than under IT because ination
and output volatility are reduced, while the promise of above-average future
ination when at the lower bound means that the economy exits rapidly from
ZLB episodes . As a result, it is optimal to set trend ination close to zero under
PT, so that the welfare gains of lower trend ination can be realised while still
keeping the overall welfare costs of the ZLB low.
The potential welfare gains from PT through this channel are quantitatively
quite signicant: raising the response to the price level in the Taylor rule from
0 to 0.25 implies a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent increase in aggregate
consumption of 0.5 per cent.20 This nding and the results of Nakov (2008) are
further examples of PT dominating IT when policymakers commit to simple
Taylor rules.
3.3 Financial frictions
The recent nancial crisis has underlined the potential importance of nancial
frictions for the real economy. It is therefore important to establish whether
PT dominates IT in models with these frictions which are subject to substantial
nancial disturbances. We discuss here some recent contributions in this area
and their implications for the IT versus PT debate. We caution the reader,
however, that this literature is at an early stage and presently relies on quite
simple models of the nancial sector.
19Nakov (2008) notes that the loss under IT is much larger if interest rate smoothing is not
permitted. The reason is that interest rate smoothing implies history dependence, which is
otherwise absent under IT.
20Positive trend ination has three distinct costs in New Keynesian models; see Ambler
(2007) for a useful discussion. The traditional welfare cost of ination due to ination acting
as a tax on money holdings (see Bailey, 1956) is not one of them. It is therefore conceivable
that the welfare gains attainable from lowering trend ination under PT could be larger than
estimated by Coibion et al. (2012).
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Dib et al. (2008) investigated the impact of PT within a medium-scale open
economy New Keynesian model whose parameters were estimated on Canadian
data. The model is augmented with credit market imperfections as in Bernanke
et al. (1999) and entrepreneurs who enter into one-period nominal debt con-
tracts in order to nance investment. In this model, PT signicantly lowers the
distortion in the economy that arises due to nominal debt contracts, because
ination expectations are better stabilised than under an IT regime, which in
turn lowers real interest rate variability. As a result, the welfare gains from
PT are strengthened. More recently, Dib et al. (2013) use the same model
to show the additional result that a PT Taylor rule outperforms an IT Taylor
rule when the rules are extended to include a response to the external nance
premium. Consequently, the case for PT remains intact even if the central bank
can respond directly to nancial variables in its policy rules.
Covas and Zhang (2010) also focus on the implications of nancial market
imperfections for comparisons of IT and PT, but they compare the two regimes
in a New Keynesian model with imperfections in both debt and equity markets.
The parameters of the model were again estimated for the Canadian economy.
They nd that PT outperforms IT in terms of stabilisation because the expec-
tations channel means that ination is better anchored under PT, so that it is
less costly for the central bank to address nancial market distortions through
monetary policy. It should be noted, however, that the benets of PT become
smaller in this model as nancial market imperfections are strengthened.
Lastly, Bailliu et al. (2012) study the interaction between macroprudential
rules and monetary policy in a model with nancial market imperfections which
are again introduced through debt contracts as in Bernanke et al. (1999). The
model is estimated on Canadian data and calibrated accordingly. Under opti-
mised IT and PT Taylor rules, it is benecial to respond to nancial imbalances
in both a Taylor rule and a macroprudential rule. Nevertheless, PT rules deliver
substantial welfare gains over IT rules due to policy being history dependent.
These results provide further conrmation that augmenting New Keynesian
models with simple nancial frictions does not substantially alter the relative
performance of IT and PT regimes, as well as additional evidence that PT tends
to dominate IT when policymakers can commit to Taylor rules.
3.4 The transition from ination to price-level targeting
The Bank of Canadas 2011 Review argues that the transition to PT could be
costly because households and rms may not understand the workings of the new
regime and ignore it when forming expectations. This could lead to a situation
where PT initially has imperfect credibility and agents actively learn about the
new regime.21 Several studies in the literature have assessed the performance
of PT in these circumstances. For instance, Gaspar et al. (2007) set up a
New Keynesian model where PT initially has imperfect credibility and agents
21 Imperfect credibility is a situation where agents do not believe fully that PT will be
implemented by policymakers.
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expectations are determined by adaptive learning as in Evans and Honkapohja
(2001). They nd that an initial period of imperfect credibility and learning is
su¢ cient to turn the net welfare gains from PT negative if agents are slow to
learn.
Kryvtsov et al. (2008) model imperfect credibility as an exogenous process
that converges towards perfect credibility over time. In the baseline New Key-
nesian model, it takes two-and-a-half years for the PT central bank to earn
enough credibility to outperform IT, but this relatively short period is enough
to ensure that IT dominates PT in net welfare terms. Cateau et al. (2009)
extend the analysis of the transition from IT to PT using the Bank of Canadas
main policy analysis model, ToTEM. They nd results more favourable to PT:
the long run welfare gains dominate the short run transition costs as long as the
initial spell of imperfect credibility lasts less than 13 years. Finally, in relation
to the lower bound on nominal interest rates, preliminary analysis by Cateau
and Dorich (2012) suggests that the welfare gains of PT hinge crucially on the
assumption that the new regime has a high level of crediblity.
Intuitively, PT performs poorly relative to IT in these studies because the
expectational benets of a price-level target are lost if agents are backward-
looking or do not take the new regime fully into account in their expectations.
We thus see again that the assumption of rational expectations is central to
the costs and benets of PT relative to IT. Moreover, the nding that initial
periods of imperfect credibility and learning can overturn the welfare gains from
PT arises because in many models the gains are relatively modest, albeit eco-
nomically non-trivial. For instance, many of the studies in this survey that nd
in favour of PT conclude that the potential welfare gains would be equivalent
to a permanent increase in aggregate consumption of less than 0.1 per cent.22
Hence, a crucial issue when evaluating the case for PT is the extent to which
agents expectations are forward-looking and take account of the new regime
in the short-term before it has gained full credibility, since it is this which will
determine whether or not welfare gains are realised in practice.
3.5 Summary
A key nding from the macro stabilisation literature is that PT can potentially
improve upon IT in New Keynesian models. In these models, optimal policy
implies price stationarity and history dependence key features of a PT regime.
Although the price stationarity result and the performance of PT under discre-
tion are not robust, PT consistently outperforms IT when policymakers commit
to simple Taylor rules. This result is robust in the sense that it holds for exten-
sions of the baseline New Keynesian model, including open economies, the zero
lower bound, and nancial frictions, but the assumption that agents understand
PT and incorporate it into their expectations is crucial. The benecial e¤ects
22See, for example, Dib et al. (2008), Covas and Zhang (2010), Bailliu et al. (2012), and
Dib et al. (2013). An alternative measure of the welfare gain from PT is reported by Kryvtsov
et al. (2008), but they note that even under immediate perfect credibility, PT gives only a
small welfare gain over IT (p. 20).
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of PT therefore seem to hang on the assumption that agents are rational and
the economy New Keynesian. We therefore focus in the remainder of the survey
on empirical evidence on rational expectations and New Keynesian models.
4 Survey and experimental evidence on rational
expectations
As our discussion above makes clear, rational expectations are crucial in order
for PT to have benecial e¤ects. It is therefore important to test this assumption
scientically. Broadly speaking, empirical evidence on rational expectations has
come from two sources: studies investigating the performance of macro models
with rational expectations, and surveys and experiments. This section focuses
on the survey and experimental evidence..
4.1 Survey evidence on rational expectations
Surveys have been a popular way of testing the rational expectations assump-
tion. On an intuitive level this popularity is hardly surprising: surveys give
researchers the freedom to ask the right questionwhile also enabling them to
collect expectations data at the disaggregated level at which household decisions
are taken. Tests of rational expectations using individual-level survey data can
also avoid biases that arise from aggregation or pooling of forecast data (see e.g.
Bonham and Cohen, 2001). However, there are some well-known di¢ culties
with surveys. In markets the expectations that matter are those of the active
market participants and surveys may not identify these people. This means that
survey respondents may be inattentive and poorly informed. Other potential
problems include truthfulness and accurate recall.
Some well-known surveys are the Livingston Series in the US and the Con-
federation of British Industry (CBI) survey in the UK, both of which survey
professional economists. Early tests using these surveys concluded that expec-
tations are not strictly rational because expectational errors are not serially
uncorrelated over time, although some studies were not able to reject the as-
sumption of unbiasedness conclusively (see Holden et al. 1985, Ch. 3). More
recently, Thomas (1999) shows that ination expectations in the Livingstone
Survey clearly reject the unbiasedness test of the rational expectations hypoth-
esis based on sub-samples from 1960 to 1980 and 1980 to 1997. Interestingly,
however, he also nds that an unbiasedness test does not reject rational expec-
tations on the full sample from 1960 to 1997, though Mankiw et al. (2003) are
able to overturn this result using a slighlty longer sample period. Because the
surveys used in these studies question professional economists, they should not
be vulnerable to the criticism that participants are inactive or poorly informed.
These studies would appear to provide convincing evidence that ination ex-
pectations are not rational.
However, in a recent contribution, Andolfatto et al. (2008) provide a possi-
ble explanation for these rejections of rational expectations. They set up a New
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Keynesian model where agents do not have full information about the state of
the economy. In particular, monetary policy follows a Taylor rule with tran-
sitory monetary policy shocks and occasional persistent switches in the long
run ination target, but agents cannot observe these two shocks separately and
therefore solve a signal extraction problem using the Kalman lter. Andolfatto
et al. show that running standard tests of unbiasedness on simulated ination
expectations will incorrectly reject the rational expectations hypothesis. The
key to this result is that since agents cannot disentangle the e¤ects of transitory
and persistent shocks, rational expectations will imply unbiased expectations in
population, but not necessarily in small samples. This nding suggests that the
results in Thomas (1999) and Mankiw et al. (2003) should not be interpreted
as conclusive statistical evidence against rational expectations.
Support for rationality within models with less than full information has
also been provided by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). Using survey ex-
pectations data from several di¤erent sources, they show that forecast errors
consistently move in the same direction as the variable being forecast in re-
sponse to a variety of macro shocks. While this feature is predicted by both
sticky-information and noisy informationmodels, there is more support for the
predictions of the latter in the survey data.23 It should be emphasised, how-
ever, that both Andolfatto et al. (2008) and Coibion and Gorodnichnko (2012)
consider a weaker form of rational expectations that is typically assumed in the
literature since the agents in these models do not have full information on the
state of the economy. Given the potential problems with obtaining conclusive
survey evidence on rational expectations, it is important to bring other sources
of evidence to bear on whether expectations are rational.
4.2 Experimental evidence on rational expectations
An alternative approach to assessing expectations that has gained popularity in
recent years is the use of lab experiments. Like surveys, experiments are exible
and can be targeted at individuals. The main advantage of the experimental
approach is that the behaviour and expectations of participants can be studied
within a particular economic modelconstructed by the researcher in a carefully
controlled setting. This approach has been used widely in the micro literature
but more sparingly in macroeconomics.
An early contribution to the macro literature was Smith et al. (1988). They
studied spot asset trading in an experimental environment and concluded that
tradersexpectations converge upon rational expectations as they acquire more
experience through market interaction. This occured after several runs of the
experiment (with the same subjects) that were characterised by speculative
behaviour, suggesting an initial period of learning before convergence on the
rational expectations equilibrium. However, Lei et al. (2001) found using a
rened version of that experiment that at least some agents display irrational
23The term noisy informationis used by Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012). For examples
of these models, see Lucas (1972) and Sims (2003).
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behaviour during the learning phase, while in a di¤erent experiment Bloomeld
and Hales (2002) found that experimental subjects who were told that the data-
generating process was a random walk did not have static expectations, the
rational expectations solution in this case. Their beliefs were instead consistent
with switches between a trending regime and a mean-reverting one.
The subsequent literature also contains mixed results, but several recent
studies suggest that rational expectations might be a much better approxima-
tion than previously thought. For instance, the experimental data obtained by
Heemejer et al. (2009) suggest that rational expectations might be a reason-
able rst approximation: the large majority of participants in the study had
mean expectation errors which were not signicantly di¤erent from zero, and
expectation errors were not signicantly autocorrelated.24 . More recently, Bao
et al. (2013) set out to understand how agents would learn a rational expec-
tations equilibrium, with a focus on comparing the performance of individuals
versus two-person teams. They set up an experiment where participants had
to forecast future prices and make production decisions within a cobweb model.
In both cases there is convergence on the rational expectations equilibrium, but
the speed of convergence is somewhat faster for teams than individuals (10.7
periods versus 42.3 periods). These results suggest that teamwork may help
participants to nd the rational expectations equilibrium. This is an interesting
observation given that many economic decisions are decided at the household
level and not individually.
In relation to the IT versus PT debate, Amano et al. (2011) investigated
whether experimental participants were able to accurately forecast ination in
a simulated PT regime. They found that forecasts did adjust somewhat under
a PT regime, but not to the extent that the implications of a price-level target
were fully reected in expectations. It is important to note, however, that
these ndings were obtained under conditions relatively unfavourable to PT:
participants were given minimal information about the model economy and had
the shift in regime from IT to PT explained to them only once. It is also worth
noting that ination was forecast at the individual level, yet many economic
decisions are taken at the level of the household in practice. Given the results
of Bao et al. (2013), this may understate the true level of understanding of PT
because it seems that two heads are better than one.
In another experiment, Kryvtsov and Petersen (2013) set out to determine
whether the stabilisation benets of monetary policy through the expectations
channel in New Keynesian models are likely to be borne out in practice. Around
three-quarters of the stabilisation benets obtainable under full rational expec-
tations were realised in the experiment, suggesting that rational expectations
are a much better approximation than strict adaptive expectations. At the
same time, however, agents forecasts appear to be partly backward-looking,
with signicant weights on last periods ination and output gap realisations.
One weakness of experiments is that they are subject to some of the same
24For a detailed discussion of the inferences that can be drawn from this experiment, see
Wagener (forthcoming). That paper also provides a useful survey of the experimental evidence
on rational expectations.
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criticisms as surveys: subjects may alter their behaviour under experimental
conditions and active market participants may not be identied. It is also well-
known that experimental outcomes can be sensitive to the rules of the game,
as the results of Lei et al. (2001) and Bao et al. (2013) demonstrate. Lastly,
the usefulness of experiments in addressing macro issues is likely to be limited
by the need to rely on simple economic models and the fact that it is di¢ cult to
recreate the kind of economic environment that agents face in the real world in a
laboratory setting. Given the potential problems with surveys and experiments,
we focus on the applied macro literature in the remainder of the survey.
5 Testing the models used in evaluating price-
level targeting
In this section, we provide a discussion of the applied macro literature on ra-
tional expectations. We survey recent developments including estimated dy-
namic general equilibrium models and renements and alternatives to rational
expectations before turning to a recent literature that has tested the restric-
tions implied by New Keynesian models with rational expectations using formal
statistical tests.
5.1 The empirical performance of macro models
Macro models with rational expectations became commonplace after rational
expectations revolution of the 1970s, yet few formal attempts were made to test
these models against alternatives with di¤erent expectational assumptions. Fair
(1993) was an early exception; we briey discuss his results in order to bring out
some important issues in testing and how the literature has responded to these.
Fairs model was set-up to nest both rational and adaptive expectations, thus
enabling a direct test of the rational expectations hypothesis. The equations
of the model come from a medium-scale macro model with current and lagged
values of macro variables and future expected values based on current informa-
tion. The testof rational expectations amounts to testing the joint signicance
of the estimated coe¢ cients on the forward-looking variables in each individual
equation of the model. In total, this test was conducted for 16 separate equa-
tions, including 7 describing the behaviour of the household sector, 5 describing
the behaviour of rms, and additional equations for investment, employment,
interest rates, and asset prices. Each equation was estimated using quarterly
data from the postwar period.
The results show some support for the rational expectations hypothesis. In
particular, half of the estimated equations have signicant lead coe¢ cients at
the 1% level for at least one of the tests, with the strongest support coming from
the 7 household equations, of which 5 are statistically signicant. In the other 8
cases, the null hypothesis of adaptive expectations was not rejected. The testing
procedure is not without problems, however, as recent research has highlighted.
One important problem is that the model solution for the future expectations
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of endogenous variables will typically include lags of the same variable; hence
it is unclear whether these tests have much power or indeed that the relevant
equations are identied. To give a pertinent example, it is widely recognised
that equations with lagged ination may be equivalent to the solution of those
with future expectations.25
A second problem is that the test is a partial information test: each equa-
tion is tested on a individual basis, so there is no unambiguous accept/reject
decision for the model as a whole. More importantly, this means that the cross-
equation restrictions implied by rational expectations are left untested. The
recent literature that we discuss below has overcome these limitations by using
full-information methods. A nal weakness of the test conducted by Fair (1993)
is that it is vulnerable to the Lucas critique of policy evaluation (Lucas, 1976):
the model is not derived from rst-order conditions, so it does not contain deep
parametersthat can be expected to be invariant to structural change.
In order to address these concerns, macroeconomic models are now built,
as standard, from models of the economy with market clearing and optimising
households and rms with rational expectations. These micro-founded dynamic
stochastic general equilibrium models were popularised by the pioneering con-
tribution of Kydland and Prescott (1982), who showed that, in such a model,
technological shocks alone could account for a surprisingly large fraction of US
output volatility. Since Kydland and Prescotts paper, researchers have aug-
mented real business cycle models with New Keynesian nominal rigidities in
order to provide a plausible stabilisation role for monetary policy. These mod-
els do a good job of matching several key features of aggregate data when hit
with real and nominal shocks, as we discuss below. It is this combination of ap-
pealing theoretical foundations and empirical performance that has made New
Keynesian models dominant in the macroeconomic stabilisation literature dis-
cussed in Section 3.
An important contribution to the modern applied macro literature was
Christiano et al. (2005). They set up a medium-scale New Keynesian model
with staggered wage contracts, variable capacity utilisation, investment adjust-
ment costs, and indexation of prices and wages to past ination. The model was
estimated on quarterly US data over the postwar period using Bayesian meth-
ods. The estimated model was able to replicate the impulse response functions
of several important macroeconomic aggregates in response to monetary policy
shocks, as estimated using a vector autoregression (VAR). In particular, the
model does a good job of accounting quantitatively for the impulse responses of
ination, output and real wages, as well as the lagged, hump-shaped responses
of consumption, investment, prots and labour productivity. Therefore, aug-
menting the New Keynesian model with real and nominal frictions enables it to
mimic the dynamic responses of several key variables to nominal shocks.
Smets and Wouters (2007) go even further. They show that a New Keyne-
25For example, the solution for ination under optimal commitment in the baseline New
Keynesian model is t = t 1 + ut; where  depends on the parameters of the model
(see Clarida et al. 1999, p. 1704). Hence Ett+1 = t + Etut+1 is a function of t 1.
Similar arguments apply to the output gap solution.
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sian model with several sources of real and nominal rigidities and 7 orthogonal
shocks (both real and nominal) can match several additional dynamic features
of US data, and that the model as a whole performs well in out-of-sample fore-
cast tests. In particular, the estimated model does as well as a Bayesian VAR
with 4 lags based on both marginal likelihood and a more traditional out-of-
sample forecasting exercise. Notably, in the out-of-sample forecasting exercise,
the model performs comparably to the BVAR(4) over short horizons and does
considerably better at long horizons such as 2 or 3 years.
Some recent papers have considered renements of rational expectations in
medium-scale New Keynesian models in the spirit of Christiano et al. (2005)
and Smets and Wouters (2007). For instance, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2012)
show how one can model news, that is, the arrival of information on future
macro shocks prior to the time when those shocks are actually realised. Fuji-
wara et al. (2011) and Khan and Tsoukalas (2011) both estimate medium-scale
models with news shocks and sticky prices and wages. Fujiwara et al. (2011)
nd that the inclusion of news shocks signicantly improves the t of the New
Keynesian model in the case of the US economy, but not for Japan. Khan and
Tsoukalas (2011) show that the importance of news shocks is sensitive to model
structure, shocks and the data used in estimation, making it hard to draw any
general conclusions about the contribution of news shocks to business cycles.
Other renements to rational expectations that have had some success empir-
ically include sticky information(Mankiw and Reis, 2002; Mankiw and Reis,
2007), rational inattention(Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009; Mackowiak and
Wiederholt, 2011), and imperfect information (Levine et al., 2012).26 The main
appeal of these approaches is that they help macro models to match inertia in
the data in the absence of ad hoc features such as indexation and habit for-
mation which have little empirical support.27 While these approaches have not
yet been shown to convincingly outperform standard models with full rational
expectations, they are clearly a promising avenue for future research.
A more substantial deviation from rational expectations that has gained
traction recently is adaptive learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001). Under
this approach, agents in the model behave like econometricians, running simple
regressions in order to form forecasts, and updating these forecasts over time as
new data arrives. The rational expectations equilibrium is often learnablein
these models i.e. adaptive learning may converge on the rational expectations
equilibrium but this is not guaranteed. Estimated New Keynedian models un-
der adaptive learning have become common in recent years. For instance, Milani
(2007) estimated a New Keynesian model and found that the estimated coe¢ -
26Levine et al. (2012) consider a rational expectations model with imperfect information
and also a model with adaptive expectations, which we discuss below. In the model with
imperfect information, agents do not have full information about state variables in the system
and shocks hitting the economy, so they solve real-time ltering problems to make inferences
about the values of these variables. Milani (2012) provides a useful survey of alternative
approaches to modelling expectations in general equilibrium models.
27For instance, the empirical evidence on price-setting cited in Section 2.2 indicates that
nominal prices remain xed for substantial periods. This is strongly at odds with the assump-
tion that rms who cannot re-optimise index their prices to past ination.
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cients on habit formation and indexation of prices to past ination fall to almost
zero under adaptive learning because it generates substantial endogenous per-
sistence in ination and output. More recently, Slobodyan and Wouters (2012)
estimated the Smets and Wouters (2007) model using an updated dataset and
found that adaptive learning improves upon the t of the rational expectations
version of the model.
In Section 5.4, we consider a test of rational expectations against behavioural
expectations (i.e. heuristics), as used by Brock and Hommes (1997), Brazier et
al. (2006), De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) and De Grauwe (2010), amongst
others. Behavioural expectations bear some resemblance to adaptive learning
in the sense that agents use statistical methods in order to make their forecasts
(in this case by choosing the weights on di¤erent forecasting rules based on
their past performance), but these expectations are probably closest to those
in the composite behavioural model of Levine et al. (2012) in which some
agents have adaptive expectations.28 They estimate, using Bayesian methods,
a New Keynesian model in which a fraction of agents have full rational expecta-
tions and the remaining fraction form expectations adaptively. The composite
model clearly outperforms a model with only rational expectations based on the
likelihood race methodology.29 In contrast to these ndings and those of the
adaptive learning literature, the formal statistical test that we discuss in Section
5.4 strongly favours a New Keynesian model with rational expectations over one
with non-rational expectations. We emphasise that this test is not vulnerable
to criticisms of the assumption that prices are indexed to past ination because
it is based on a model where price indexation is absent.
5.1.1 Summary
New Keynesian models have been successful matching the dynamics of aggre-
gate macro data. The literature has recently considered renements of rational
expectations that might improve the t of these models further. The logical next
step is to test these models against the data using formal statistical tests that
accept or reject the model and variants of it. Such tests should narrow down the
set of models that need to be considered in future research by rejecting those
that cannot match the data. As we discuss below, this challenge has been taken
on by a recent strand of applied macro literature. We discuss this literature in
the next section before turning to a direct test of rational expectations versus
behavioural expectations in a New Keynesian model.
28Levine et al. (2012) note in passing (see p. 1288) that the expectations in their model
are similar in spirit to both adaptive learning and behavioural expectations.
29As Levine et al. (2012, p. 1298) note, a limitation of the likelihood race methodology
is that the assessment of model t is only relative to rival models with di¤erent restrictions.
Hence, the outperforming model may still be poor at capturing important dynamics in the
data, making it di¢ cult to draw any rm conclusions from these results.
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5.2 Testing macro models: indirect inference
Indirect inference is a simulation-based method used for estimating or evalu-
ating economic models (Smith, 1993; Gourieoux and Monfort, 1996). Its dis-
tinguishing feature is the use of an auxiliary modelwhich need not be cor-
rectly specied to represent the time series properties in the data. Estimation
and evaluation are based upon the auxiliary model, which acts as a criterion
function that selects important features in the data; this is the sense in which
inference is indirect. Indirect inference has most commonly been used to esti-
mate structural economic models . An important advantage of this approach is
that estimation is possible when the likelihood function is di¢ cult to evaluate
or analytically cumbersome (Canova, 2007). Indeed, indirect inference can be
used to estimate almost any economic model from which data can be simulated.
Indirect inference basically chooses the parameters of the macro model so that,
from the point of the view of the auxiliary model, the actual and simulated data
look similar. In this respect, researchers can use indirect inference to focus on
matching those aspects in the data which they view as most important. The ex-
tension of indirect inference to the case of evaluating macro models is discussed
in detail below, as this our main focus in this section.
Indirect inference can be used to test whether a macro model can simulate
behaviour that is likethe behaviour in the data, where the data behaviour is
summarised by the reduced form representation of some unknown true model,
or an approximation to it. Typically, the reduced form approximation is a
VAR or a VECM.30 Then the question is whether the structural macro model
could have been the generating mechanism of these coe¢ cients. We can answer
this question by simulating the model over the same data period with repeated
samples of its own errors these samples will give us pseudo-historiesthat the
model was capable of generating, and we can then ask whether the actual data
(as captured by its estimated reduced form coe¢ cients) could have been one of
these histories.
To formalise this intuition, we explain the indirect inference testing proce-
dure. The method works as follows. Suppose we have a macro model with
a xed vector of structural parameters  which can be taken as given, having
been reached either by estimation or calibration. Let the vector of auxiliary
VAR parameters associated with simulated data of length T periods from the
model be denoted T (). The corresponding parameter vector from the VAR
on the actual data of length T periods is denoted aT . Under the null hypothesis
that the model is correct, the Wald statisticW () for a test of the model against
the data is based on the di¤erence between the VAR parameters estimated from
the data aT , and the mean VAR parameter vector T;N () estimated from N
30Wickens (2011, pp. 506-8) has shown that DSGE models will have a VARMA or VARIMA
representation. Indirect inference can proceed with approximations to this because the re-
searcher runs a VAR (or VECM) using the data from the simulated model; hence the models
simulations of the approximation give rise to the distribution against which the approximating
VAR or VECM on the data is tested for whether it comes from this distribution.
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bootstrapped samples from the macro model:31
W () =d0
() 1d (9)
where d  aT   T;N () and 
() 1 is the inverse variance-covariance matrix
of the distribution of d.
Notice that the Wald test statistic can be interpreted as a quadratic loss
function in the deviations of the VAR parameters estimated on the data from
those implied (on average) by the bootstrapped macro model. Essentially, the
Wald statistic is assessing whether the VAR parameters for the data fall outside
the joint condence limit of the model-simulated parameter distribution. High
values of the Wald statistic will reject the null hypothesis that the model is the
data-generating process because they tell us that it is unlikely that the VAR
parameters in the data could have been generated by the simulated model.
It should be noted that the Wald statistic has typically been compared to its
simulated bootstrap distribution and not the asymptotic distribution implied by
theory under the null. It is therefore the percentiles of the bootstrap distribution
that provide the basis for accepting or rejecting a particular model, with a Wald
statistic higher than the 95% critical value being the standard rejection criterion.
The Wald test is thus an example of what Canova (2007) calls a size testof an
economic model. In a simple univariate size test the researcher might compare a
particular correlation in the data with the distribution of correlations implied by
many simulations of an economic model, rejecting the model if the real-world
correlation does not fall within a particular condence interval.32 The Wald
test is based on the same logic, but it is more general because it enables the
researcher to conduct an overall test of a model based on its joint parameter
distribution.
Moreover, it is important to note that although the Wald statistic in Equa-
tion (9) considers only a direct test of the VAR parameters, the test can easily
be augmented to include the variances of key macro variables or the impulse
response functions implied by the VAR coe¢ cients. The papers we discuss be-
low take this more general approach, so we provide some technical details in a
footnote for interested readers.33
5.3 Testing the degree of nominal rigidity in the US econ-
omy using indirect inference
Le et al. (2011) use indirect inference to investigate the degree of nominal
rigidity in the US economy in the postwar period. This paper provides a useful
31Bootstrapping N samples avoids the weaknesses associated with a test based on a single
random sample of simulated data.
32For example, Lim and McNelis (2008, Ch. 9, pp. 17172) simulate the distribution of
the real-wage employment correlation in an open economy New Keynesian model and discuss
how a size test could be conducted using this distribution.
33 If we let g(:) denote a vector valued function that includes the di¤erent aspects of the
data that are to be tested, the Wald statistic will be amended to W () = d0
() 1d, where
now d  g(aT )  g(T;N ()) .
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example of indirect inference in action and is relevant to our discussion here
because it sheds light on the performance of New Keynesian models in formal
statistical tests. Le et al. consider a weighted version of the Smets and Wouters
(2007) model in which a New Classical sector with exible wages and prices
and a one-quarter information lag are introduced. The coe¢ cients of the model
 including the relative weight on the New Classical sector  are chosen to
minimise a Wald statistic based on the VAR parameters and the variances of
key macro variables. Several notable results emerge. The most striking results
come from the post-1984 Great Moderation period: the Wald-minimising model
has a weight of almost 1 on the New Keynesian wage and price sectors and passes
the test comfortably with a Wald percentile of 83.8%. These results show that
New Keynesian models with rational expectations can successfully mimic some
key features of the data and pass a stringent statistical test. Interestingly,
when the model is estimated on the entire postwar period, the Wald-minimising
weights on the New Keynesian part of the model are noticeably lower (suggesting
that nominal rigidity has increased over time) and the minimum Wald of 98.7%
exceeds the standard rejection percentile of 95%, so that the model is rejected.
Overall, the results of Le et al. (2011) provide support for New Keynesian
models while suggesting, at the same time, that there is considerable scope for
improvement. In the next section we ask whether a behavioural expectations
version of the New Keynesian model can improve on the baseline model.
We focus on behavioural expectations for two reasons. First, these expecta-
tions have no forward-looking component, so they imply a model in which IT
will clearly dominate PT (see Section 3); therefore, a nding in favour of behav-
ioural expectations would imply that adopting PT could be costly and thus lend
fresh support to the Bank of Canadas justications for sticking with IT. Sec-
ond, models with behavioural expectations have had some success in accounting
for puzzles in the nance literature. For instance, Bernatzi and Thaler (1995)
show how loss aversion could account for the equity premium puzzle, while
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) show that a behavioral nance model of the
foreign exchange market can produce excess kurtosis and fat-tails in exchange
rate returns.
These models have also had some success in formal statistical tests against
the data. As shown by ap Gwilym (2010), for example, a simple behavioural
nance model cannot be rejected as the data-generating process of the FTSE.
One problem, however, is that empirical tests of single series su¤er from low
power to reject the null that the model is the true data-generating process;
indeed, Meenagh et al. (2007) show that an e¢ cient markets model with rational
expectations and regime-switching can also match the time series properties of
the FTSE. This di¢ culty points to need for higher-power multivariate tests to
distinguish between rational and behavioural expectations. We consider such a
test in the next section.
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5.4 A test of rational versus behavioural expectations in
a macro model of the US economy
In this section we discuss a test of behavioural versus rational expectations
based on indirect inference. As noted above, this method tests whether a macro
model can match the joint statistical distributions of moments in the data a
powerful test. In considering such tests, we emphasise that these are tests of a
joint hypothesis about expectations and New Keynesian models. It may well be
the case that alternative macro models or expectational assumptions could pass
these statistical tests, but as far as we know there is no evidence bearing on this
question available at this time. Clearly, if the model with rational expectations
is rejected we cannot not know for sure whether this is down to the model
itself or the rational expectations assumption; either way PT must come into
question. However, if the model is not rejected, then it also follows that we
cannot reject the arguments for PT that come from these models. Thus there is
an important asymmetry in these tests: rejection leads to doubt and rethinking,
including of PT, whereas non-rejection leads to survival of the model and benet
of the doubt for PT. This is what we turn to now in examining such a test.
Liu and Minford (2012) test a rational expectations version of the baseline
New Keynesian model against a version based on behavioural expectations; we
go into it in some detail because it is the only available test of these rival models
of which we are aware. The behavioural model is a standard New Keynesian-
type model similar to that in De Grauwe (2010). It consists of an IS curve, a
Phillips curve, and a Taylor rule:
ext = ~Etext+1   a1(Rt   ~Ett+1) + "1t (10)
t = b1ext +  ~Ett+1 + k"2t (11)
Rt = (1  c1)(c2t + c3ext) + c1Rt 1 + "3t (12)
where ext is the output gap, t is the rate of ination, Rt is the nominal
interest rate, and "1t, "2t, and "3t are the demand error, supply error and
policy error respectively.
These errors are assumed to be autoregressive processes. The errors are
extracted from the model and the data; thus the model implies the errors,
conditional on the data. Equation (10) is the IS curve, where ~E refers to ex-
pectations that are not formed rationally. The IS curve is standard, including
the expectation of output gap in the next period and the real interest rate.
Equation (11) is a New Keynesian Phillips curve augmented with behavioural
expectations, while Equation (12) is a Taylor rule with interest rate smoothing.
The di¤erence between the behavioural and rational expectations models lies
in expectations formation. The expectation term in the behavioural model, ~E
is the weighted average of two kinds of forecasting rule. One is the fundamental
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forecasting rule, by which agents forecast the output gap or ination at their
steady state values. The other one is the extrapolative rule, by which individuals
extrapolate the most recent value into the future. Thus:
~Eft ext+1 = 0 (13)
~Eet ext+1 = ext 1 (14)
~Etart t+1 = 0 (15)
~Eextt t+1 = t 1 (16)
Equations (13) and (14) are the forecasting rules for the output gap, while
Equations (15) and (16) are the forecasting rules for ination. The steady state
output gap is zero, while the ination target in the Taylor Rule is the steady
state ination rate, which is set at zero since the data is linearly detrended and
demeaned.
In De Grauwe (2010), it is assumed that the market forecast is the weighted
average of the fundamentalist and extrapolative rules. Equation (17) is the
market forecast for the output gap, while Equation (18) is the market forecast
for ination:
~Etext+1 = f;t  0 + e;text 1 = e;text 1 (17)
~Ett+1 = tar;t  0 + ext;tt 1 = ext;tt 1 (18)
where f;t and e;t are the probabilities that agents will use a fundamentalist
and extrapolative rule for forecasting the output gap, tar;t and ext;t are the
equivalents for ination. These probabilities sum to one and are determined by
past forecast success of the two rules in an intuitive way.
The solution method to the behavioural model is obtained by substituting
the expectation formation of Equations (17) and (18) into Equations (10) and
(11). The model therefore becomes
ext = e;text 1   a1(Rt   ext;tt 1) + "1t (19)
t = b1ext + (ext;tt 1) + k"2t (20)
Rt = (1  c1)(c2t + c3ext) + c1Rt 1 + "3t (21)
The rational expectations model is dened as Equation (10)-(12), except that
the expectations are formed rationally. In other words, it is a version of the base-
line New Keynesian model. Notice that since the only specication di¤erence
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between the two models is in the nature of these expectations, the compari-
son tests the di¤erent expectational assumptions while allowing each model the
benet of reestimation of parameter values. The rational expectations version
of the model can be solved in the standard way; Dynare (Adjemian, 2011) is
used for this. As Equations (19)-(21) make clear, the behavioural expectations
model is purely backward-looking. Therefore, the test here is between the base-
line New Keynesian model in which PT is clearly dominant (Vestin, 2006) and
a backward-looking version of the same model in which IT clearly dominates
PT.
The results are shown in Table 1, which includes the Wald percentiles for
both models, broken down by variances alone (volatility), VAR coe¢ cients
alone (dynamics), and the full vector of descriptors. In all aspects the behav-
ioural model is strongly rejected, while the rational expectations model comfort-
ably passes the Wald test. It should be emphasised that this is after allowing
each model to explore all possible values for all the models parameters to nd
the set of bestparameter values that gets closest to the data behaviour.
Wald percentile (%) Behavioural Rational
Dynamics (VAR coe¤s) 100 90.0
Volatility (variances) 96.0 24.2
Overall (all ) 100 79.8
Table 1: Comparison of Behavioural and Rational Expectations Models, indi-
rectly re-estimated Parameters
It may seem counter-intuitive that a theory of expectations so apparently
unrealistic as rational expectations could replicate macro behaviour so much
better than behavioural expectations. However, as Muth (1961, p. 318) points
out, in an economy with informed and misinformed agents, the well-informed
agents could prot by selling their information to the misinformed agents. This
mechanism may explain how superior information initially held by a small num-
ber of agents eventually makes its way into the hands of economically active
agents. For instance, Minford and Peel (2002) argue that rational expectations
rests on the ability of competitive markets in information to process it e¢ -
ciently: industries grow up to make these markets as e¢ cient as possible such
as analysts, portfolio advisers, forecasters, hedge funds, and investment banks.
The ordinary personmay not have literal rational expectations but is enabled
to access sources with superior information. Under this argument, realistic but
non-rational expectations will be driven out by these sources, so that models
based on them struggle to t the data behaviour.34
In short, we do not nd it plausible that relevant information will be ne-
glected in favour of heuristics as under behavioural expectations. And while we
34This argument relies on the assumption that less-informed agents are not deliberately
misled by those who have an informational advantage. While examples of such behaviour are
observed in the real world, these actions are unlikely to be a systematic feature because they
will lead to punishment by withdrawal of custom or enforcement of the law.
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nd approaches that involve learning more plausible, we believe that rational
expectations may be a reasonable approximation for studying many policy issues
e.g. the numerous (stochastic) steady-state analyses of IT and PT reviewed
in this survey. Furthermore, in cases such as the transition to PT where some
learning may be required, we would expect agents to learn about the new regime
quite quickly as long as it is communicated in an e¤ective manner. Consistent
with this position, the empirical evidence that we have reviewed does not enable
us to reject the rational expectations hypothesis. This nding has relevance for
policymakers such as the Bank of Canada who remain sceptical about PT due
to its reliance on rational expectations.
6 Conclusion
We have surveyed recent literature comparing ination targeting (IT) and price-
level targeting (PT) as macroeconomic stabilisation policies, focusing in particu-
lar on New Keynesian models and areas that have seen signicant developments
since Amblers (2009) survey: optimal monetary policy under commitment and
discretion; the zero lower bound; nancial frictions; and the costs of transition
from IT to PT. The main conclusion reached by Ambler was that the ability
of PT to improve social welfare in New Keynesian models rests with the as-
sumption of rational expectations. The recent literature suggests that things
are more complicated than this. In particular, we highlighted an important split
in the literature: PT consistently outperforms IT when policymakers commit to
simple Taylor-type rules, but results favouring PT which are derived from mod-
els where central banks minimise loss functions can be overturned with small
deviations from the baseline New Keynesian model. We thus emerge with a
more precise version of Amblers original conclusion that we view as relevant for
real-world central banks: PT tends to improve stabilisation in New Keynesian
models when policymakers commit to simple Taylor-type rules.
Several of the developments we surveyed are initial attempts to address issues
raised by the nancial crisis. An important nding that emerges is that PT is
potentially very attractive in the context of the zero lower bound because, in
conditions of deationary recession, a price-level target induces expectations of
higher than usual ination. These expectations in turn induce negative real
interest rates which stimulate economic activity out of the recession, putting
an end to deation and ending lower bound episodes rapidly. This mechanism
raises the possibility of safely lowering trend ination under a PT regime. The
recent literature suggests that this dual mandate a price-level target with a
lower trend ination rate  could bring substantial welfare gains, though the
assumption that PT is highly credible is crucial for this result. There is also
evidence that augmenting New Keynesian models with nancial frictions leaves
intact the potential welfare gains from PT, albeit that this literature is at an
early stage. Finally, the recent literature re-a¢ rms the importance of rational
expectations in the sense that the transition from IT to PT could be costly if
agents need time to learn about the new regime and have doubts about PT.
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Since the benecial e¤ects of PT appear to hang on the joint assumption
that economic agents are rational and the economy New Keynesian, we devoted
the second half of the survey to empirical evidence on rational expectations
and the applied macro literature on the performance of New Keynesian mod-
els. In addition, we surveyed a more recent strand of applied literature that
has formally tested New Keynesian models and alternative types of expectation
formation. Overall, the evidence on rational expectations and New Keynesian
models is not clear-cut, but we note that New Keynesian models can pass formal
statistical tests against macro data and that models with rational expectations
outperform those with behavioural expectations (i.e. heuristics) in direct sta-
tistical tests. These ndings suggest that the benets of PT might be higher
than envisaged by many policymakers. We therefore conclude that policymakers
should continue to pay attention to PT in the future.
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